fittingness of Christ's occasioning of the freedom of God's *ad extra* glorification during the first three of these eschatological segments, during which his bride enjoys gospel benefits, but in part only amid an evil world. The establishment of the Son's covenantal communion with her continues despite her lack of perfect fittingness, by both his enactment of the blessed fellowship flowing from the hypostatic fellowship of the Trinity, and also through their union in the Spirit under the covenant of grace. Edwards scholars will appreciate the author's demonstration of this consistency with Edwards's concept of beauty, as the bride, endowed with a new vision of Christ's moral excellence, consents to his perfect image of his fellowship with the Father and the Spirit. Chapter 5 brings Edwards's final subperiod, the culmination of the Son's work upon the day of judgment. The author details the events surrounding the Son's fitting of his bride for her final glorification and the consummation of their blessed union at the eternal wedding feast. This finalizes his work in expressing God's freedom, which Edwards considers to be evidenced by the blessing of his creatures through the outflowing of glory from the loving fellowship of the Trinity.

Larsen's monograph is highly recommended not only for students of Jonathan Edwards but also more generally for eliciting constructive theological insight from his Christology. She concludes her study by listing several ways in which his particular conviction regarding divine freedom might foster future discussion more widely within Reformed theology, as well as informing a greater articulation of God's blessedness and beauty. More importantly, this work reminds the wider church to confess and celebrate its glorification in Christ, as the recipient of God's perfect, triune blessedness.

—David Reid
PhD Candidate,
Union Theological College, Belfast

Cornelis Jan Meeuse. *De bestrijding van het cartesianisme door Jacobus Koelman*. Labarum Academic, 2024.

The current book has been defended as a doctoral dissertation at Theological University Apeldoorn (the Netherlands) by Cornelis Jan Meeuse in June 2024, at age seventy-eight. However, its origins go back to the time when the author was in his twenties and earned his primary

teaching degree. Thanks to one of his teachers, he became intrigued by the seventeenth-century Dutch Reformed minister Jacobus Koelman, known as the "Puritan of the Further Reformation" (13, 313), and his contest with the then "new philosophy" of René Descartes (or Cartesianism). Later, Meeuse studied theology and became a minister himself. During these times, he wrote some publications on Koelman's biography and his future expectations (which is often, but not by Meeuse, called millenarianism). After he retired as a minister, he developed the subject that had raised his interest during his youth into a PhD project.

It was an excellent idea of Meeuse to devote his dissertation to the dispute with Cartesian philosophy by one of the representatives of the Dutch Further Reformation, as it has struck other scholars (e.g., Willem J. van Asselt and Paul H. A. M. Abels in *The Handbook of Dutch Church History* [2015], ed. Herman J. Selderhuis) that Cartesianism was especially impugned by representatives of the Dutch Further Reformation.

Moreover, this dissertation on a philosophical issue enriches our understanding of Koelman, who is well-known among Dutch (church) historians as the author and translator of writings on church reform and spiritual life, as well as for his Puritan-like rejection of celebrating holy days like Christmas and of the reading of liturgical forms for the sacraments. Meeuse, therefore, gets the credit for being the first scholar to give an overview of Koelman's dispute with authors whom the latter considered Cartesian.

Although Meeuse's dissertation is very informative about Koelman's argument against Cartesianism, I have a couple of remarks. My first comment is that in Meeuse's book, the contribution of the Dutch Further Reformation (and specifically of Koelman) to the dispute with Cartesianism remains unclear. On the one hand, Meeuse writes that the supporters and opponents of Cartesian philosophy "did not always coincide with certain religious associations" (315, cf. 103–4, 138), but on the other hand, he seems to suggest that "further Reformers" who criticized Cartesianism were the most fierce opponents (113, 139, 271) and that they especially complained that it dismissed the necessity of the operation of the Holy Spirit in enlightening human reason and renewing the will (139, 307, 315). Furthermore, the author does not really answer the question of why he selected among Dutch Reformed theologians or among the further reformers, Koelman, as a protagonist to investigate (13–15).

My second point of critique is that I wonder whether Meeuse doesn't view Cartesian philosophy and its alleged adherents (of which he discusses Ludovicus Wolzogen, Balthasar Bekker, and Willem Deurhof) too much

through the eyes of Koelman and too little on their own terms. For example, he states that Cartesianism brought about "a true cultural revolution" during the seventeenth century (313, 315), even a "fundamental revolution in science" (13, 315), but to what extent does that apply to all those who took up Descartes's ideas? This suggests that they copied his views, but it seems to be more likely that they were used in an eclectic manner, just as happened with Scholasticism, which, according to Meeuse, was not used slavishly (88, 306, 313).

Moreover, according to the title page, Koelman combatted "Cartesianism," but the authors that Koelman disputed only were affected by Cartesian philosophy to a certain extent (e.g., Bekker only took over from Descartes the distinction between body and soul), or they were influenced by other kind of philosophies: Bekker by Thomas Hobbes, David Joris and Baruch de Spinoza (270), Deurhoff by Spinoza (304, 320). Next, Koelman considered the new Cartesian philosophy to be the poison from which all kinds of errors and heterodox ideas would spread (311, 322). This explains why he even called Spinoza a Cartesian (239–40, 311). To what extent was that justified?

In addition, there remains ambiguity in Meeuse's evaluation of why Bekker was disputed by Koelman: was it Cartesian philosophy as being fundamental for his ideas (title page, 308, 309, 322) or Bekker's critical Bible exegesis, his rejection of the appearance of angels and devils and the risk that these views would lead to atheism (270, 308)? If the latter is more correct, why did Meeuse choose as the title of his book: *The Contest of Cartesianism* by Jacobus Koelman?

Moreover, to what extent did Koelman do justice to the authors whom he combatted? Although I can understand Meeuse's decision to omit this question, as it would require discussion of the interpretation of Koelman's opponents (37), I find it unsatisfactory that Meeuse does not even ask any critical questions about Koelman's criticism of "Cartesians." I also find it problematic that he, in my view, dismisses it by stating that it is easier to pose this question than to answer it and that Koelman put the quotations from his opponents in the framework of his own views (310). A couple of questions related to my previous point remain unanswered: did Bekker really deny the existence of spirits and demons (308), or only the opinion that they could affect human bodies?

My third remark is that Meeuse's book is more of an inventory of the arguments of Koelman against Cartesian philosophy (see, e.g., the many enumerations throughout the book) than an analysis of the reasons and

intentions of these arguments and of their implications for the philosophical and theological thoughts of Koelman and those whom he opposed. For example, Meeuse does not explain why Koelman was so critical on the Cartesian view that there are no second causes in everything that happens in the world, but that everything would come directly from God (225, 270, 309, 319, part 9). Furthermore, the question why Koelman did object against Bekker's view that God accommodated his speaking in Scripture towards ordinary people (269, 309), as the latter view was already advocated by Calvin? Next, the section on the relevance of Koelman's dispute with Cartesianism is very short (312) and, in my view, Koelman's objections against Cartesian philosophy need to be "translated" from the context of the seventeenth century to that of our age to be useful in our times.

To sum up, I am grateful for Meeuse's overview of the objections of one of the Dutch "further Reformers" against Cartesianism, but the objections of opponents of this philosophy, like Koelman, and their backgrounds and intentions need to be analyzed more critically and compared with the views of the alleged "Cartesians."

—Dr. Jan van de Kamp
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
School of Religion and Theology,
Hersteld Hervormd Seminary

Cameron Schweitzer. *Towards a Clearer Understanding of Jonathan Edwards's Biblical Typology: A Case Study inthee "Blank Bible."* JESociety Press, 2024.

In this monograph from JESociety Press, author Cameron Schweitzer addresses a lacuna in Edwardsean scholarship on the biblical typology of Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758). The New England minister, theologian, and philosopher is renowned for his distinctive use of the hermeneutic that interprets Old Testament types as foreshadowing New Testament antitypes of the person and work of Christ. By the early modern period, Reformed Orthodox exegetes employed typological interpretation of the Old Testament Scriptures where a literal one was unavailable. Perry Millar's previous assertion that New England colonial ministers during this period considered typological hermeneutics "imaginative and capricious" has since been refuted. Edwards considered not only the Bible but creation itself to be full of images and types portraying its divine creator and consequently, his use